Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir
Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir
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Papers in English

Papers in English

Here are some papers I have written in English. (I have only managed to put a couple here so far, but I'll be adding more shortly.)

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Against a Sequestered Philosophy. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 57(2): 443–464.

This paper argues that philosophical practice in the Western world, in particular analytic philosophy, suffers from problems that contribute to its lack of diversity in two senses: the exclusion of women and minorities, and a narrow choice of subjects and methods. This is not fruitful for philosophical exchange and the flourishing of philosophical thought. Three contributing factors are covered: a flawed execution when instilling intellectual humility; the gaslighting of women in philosophy; and an overemphasis on a narrow conception of intelligence. The conclusion calls for a more humane and socially aware practice of philosophy.

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Response-Dependence for Concepts is Not for Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 45(4): 377–386.

The aim of this paper is to show that response-dependence is not a metaphysically significant notion unless applied directly to properties. Therefore, a distinction between response-dependent concepts and response-dependent properties must be kept clear. While a notion of response-dependent concepts can in some cases be useful, it is quite different from a metaphysically notion of response-dependent properties. Some common accounts of response-dependence are described, and then it is shown how response-dependence can be applied to concepts without implications for properties. Two arguments for the claim that response-dependence for concepts implies response-dependence for properties are then considered and rejected.

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Stuck in the Middle: Colors between the Subjective and the Objective. Rivista di estetica 43(1): 47–65.

I argue that there are good reasons for thinking of colors as both subjective and objective. I propose a spectrum ranging from the entirely subjective to the entirely objective, with colors belonging somewhere between the two ends. I then argue that these findings about colors can be applied to other sensory properties as well because the reasons for placing colors where they belong on the spectrum hold for all sensory properties.